Application of the Exhaustion Rule in Selective Service Cases by Kresse, J. Kendrick
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 4 Article 10
1-1971
Application of the Exhaustion Rule in Selective
Service Cases
J. Kendrick Kresse
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Kendrick Kresse, Application of the Exhaustion Rule in Selective Service Cases, 22 Hastings L.J. 958 (1971).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol22/iss4/10
APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE
IN SELECTIVE SERVICE CASES
Before a Selective Service registrant may assert the invalidity of
his classification as a defense to a criminal prosecution for induction re-
fusal, he must show either (1) that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies,' or (2) that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not re-
quired under the circumstances of his case. Since the Selective Service
Act2 has never made the exhaustion of administrative remedies a re-
quirement,3 whether or not exhaustion is required has depended on ju-
dicially evolved criteria.
Since 1943 when the Supreme Court first applied the exhaustion
doctrine to a case under the act in Falbo v. United States,4 the courts
have gradually come to recognize numerous situations where exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies is not required. 5 In McKart v. United
1. A registrant who disputes his classification may either appear in person be-
fore his local board, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.1, 1624.2, 1625.13 (1971), or appeal to an ap-
peal board. Id. § 1624.2. A government appeal agent, if he deems it necessary to avoid
an injustice, may recommend on the registrant's behalf that the State Director of Se-
lective Service either request the appeal board to reconsider its determination or appeal
to the President. Id. § 1626.61. When one or more members of the appeal board dis-
sent from the registrant's classification, the registrant may appeal directly to the Presi-
dent. Id. § 1627.3.
2. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-62 (Supp. V, 1970) (originally enacted as Military Se-
lective Service Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 104).
3. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 206 (1969) (concurring opinion). 50
U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970) provides in part: "No judicial review shall be
made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards,
or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution ... after the registrant
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction ...
Provided, That such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved
to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact
for the classification assigned to such registrant.
4. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
5. E.g., United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1970) (local board
advised defendant that his claim to conscientious objector status was fruitless to pur-
sue); Davis v. United States, 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969) (local board failed to inform
defendant of his right to appeal); Powers v. Powers, 400 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968) (no
application of the doctrine if local board told defendant that appeal was not available or
that pursuit of it was not necessary or should be delayed); Wills v. United States, 384
F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967) (local board failed to notify defendant that he had been de-
clared delinquent); Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1962) (defendant
summoned to fire fighting duty during the appeal period); Glover v. United States, 286
F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961) (local board failed to inform defendant of the reason for issuing
an unappealed classification that was identical to a previously appealed classification);
United States v. Willard, 211 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1962), a!f'd, 312 F.2d 605 (6th
States', for example, the Supreme Court held that where the defen-
dant's challenge to the validity of his classification raised a question of
statutory interpretation, exhaustion would not be required.7  The Court
left open the question whether exhaustion would be required where a
defendant's challenge raised purely factual issues, such as the sincerity of
a conscientious objector claim." But McKart does set forth general
policy guidelines9 to be followed in applying the exhaustion doctrine to
all Selective Service cases where the administrative process is at an end,
and the registrant is attempting to defend against a criminal prosecu-
tion.
The thesis of this Note may be summarized as follows: where the
defendant in a selective service case challenges the validity of his local-
board classification without having first appealed the classification to
his selective service appeal board, and where the challenge raises purely
factual issues,"0 the court's decision whether or not to consider the mat-
ter should depend not only on the McKart guidelines, but on the
"waiver" or "deliberateness" test as well. "Waiver" implies a deliberate
choice to forego a known right; knowledge of the right must include
knowing the consequences of the right's abandonment." Courts use
the waiver test to protect against loss of fundamental constitutional
rights .' 2  Application of the waiver test in Selective Service prosecutions
would mean that unless the registrant knowingly and deliberately by-
passed the administrative appeal process, which includes knowing the
consequences of such action, the bypass would not preclude him from
attacking his local-board classification as a defense to a criminal prose-
cution for refusal to submit to induction.
Thus, when a registrant-defendant raises the unlawfulness of his
local-board classification as a defense to a criminal prosecution, denial
of judicial review of such a classification would be justified only if there
had been a deliberate flouting of the administrative process provided.
Cir. 1963) (defendant obeyed all orders except to report to local board for work assign-
ment); cf. United Sates v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. 395 U.S. 185 (1969), rev'g 395 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1968).
7. See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 24-28 infra.
10. But see United States v. Davila, 429 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1970), where the
court felt that only a legal issue remains once it is established that there are no facts in
the registrant's file refuting his claim of conscientious objection. See notes 56 & 83
infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
12. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 469 (1966) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (habeas corpus);
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721-23 (1948) (counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (counsel); Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (ha-
beas corpus).
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The registrant-defendant would thereby obtain access to a fair hear-
ing on the merits of his case; and his fundamental right of due process,
secured by the fifth amendment, would be protected.
In Lockhart v. United States, 3 an appeal from a conviction for re-
fusal to submit to induction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, answered in the affirmative the question that the
Supreme Court left open in McKart. Defendant Lockhart's failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies was held to bar his defense chal-
lenging the local board's denial, on the ground of insincerity, of his claim
to conscientious objector status. 14 The Ninth Circuit did not apply the
waiver test in Lockhart. The evidence showed that Lockhart did not
know the consequences of foregoing his right to administrative appeal; 1"
thus, if a waiver test had been applied, Lockhart's defense would not
have been barred.
This Note will analyze the opinion in Lockhart, particularly in
light of McKart, in an attempt to show why, in this type of case, the ap-
plication of the exhaustion doctrine is so harsh and why the waiver test
is a necessary safeguard against deprivation of due process. A dis-
cussion of the facts and opinion in McKart is necessary to show
both the similarities and differences between McKart and Lockhart.
McKart v. United States-A Question of
Judicial Prerogative
McKart was indicted and subsequently convicted for failure to re-
port for and submit to induction as ordered. Since he was an only
child whose father had been killed in World War II, McKart had been
classified as a sole surviving son and hence exempt from military serv-
ice. But when the local board learned of his mother's death, it re-
classified McKart as available for service. The local board interpreted
the pertinent provisions of the Selective Service Act to mean that Mc-
Kart's sole-surviving-son exemption became improper when his family
unit ceased to exist upon the death of his mother. McKart failed to ap-
peal the new classification; an order to report for induction followed in
due course. McKart's only defense to the prosecution for refusal to
submit was that the local board's revocation of his sole-surviving-son ex-
emption was illegal.'"
Addressing itself to the problems raised by McKart, the Supreme
Court first recognized the harshness of applying the exhaustion doctrine
13. 420 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1969), afl'g on rehearing, No. 21311 (9th Cir. Oct.
23, 1968), afj'g No. 36052 (C.D. Cal., trial date June 15, 1966).
14. Id. at 1147.
15. Id. at 1147-48. See note 46 & accompanying text infra.
16. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 187 (1969).
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in a criminal prosecution, after the administrative process is at an end."
The Court then noted that relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in
such situations would have a negligible effect on the smooth functioning
of the Selective Service System.' s With these considerations in mind,
the Supreme Court held that since McKart's challenge to his classifica-
tion merely raised a question of statutory interpretation-which, unlike
a factual question, would not require exercise of the particular exper-
tise that the Selective Service appeals boards are assumed to possess 9-
McKart's failure to appeal would not foreclose his defense challenging
the validity of the local board's reclassification.20
As for factual questions requiring the exercise of administrative
expertise or discretion-claims to ministerial or conscientious objector
exemptions, for example-the Court said that "the Selective Service
System and the courts may have a stronger interest in having the ques-
tion decided in the first instance by the local board and then by the ap-
peal board, which considers the question anew."'" Thus the Court re-
served the question whether the exhaustion doctrine would apply in a
case where the defendant's challenge to his classification raised the fac-
tual question of the sincerity of a conscientious objector claim-a ques-
tion requiring the application of administrative expertise.22
Although the Supreme Court's opinion does not explicitly note
that McKart deliberately and knowingly refused to take an adminis-
trative appeal, the court of appeals had noted that on more than one oc-
casion McKart had written to his local board stating that he would have
nothing to do with the Selective Service System.2" The Supreme Court
17. Id. at 197.
18. Id. at 199-200.
19. Id. at 197-98.
20. Id. at 200, 203. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justices Douglas and White concurred separately in the result. Justice White disagreed
with the majority's view that questions of law are beyond the expertise of the agency,
citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), and Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), to show that questions of law are normally routed through the
administrative process as are questions of fact. 395 U.S. at 205-06 (concurring opin-
ion). Justice Douglas, however, did question the applicability of that general rule to
Selective Service cases. Id. at 204. He bases his concurrence on Oestereich v. Selective
Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968): "If Oestereich could raise his claim to statutory exemp-
tion in a civil suit at a pre-induction stage, it follows a fortiori that petitioner can do so
in a criminal prosecution for failure to obey the Act's mandate." 395 U.S. at 204
(concurring opinion). Justice White concurred because the local board's decision on the
question of statutory interpretation in McKart's case had been informally reviewed and
ratified by the State and National Directors thereby giving "sufficient justification to
permit the courts to entertain petitioner's defense." Id. at 207.
21. 395 U.S. at 198 n.16 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 198 n.16, 200-01; accord, United States v. Davila, 429 F.2d 481, 484
n.4 (5th Cir. 1970); see Thompson v. United Sates, 380 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1967).
23. 395 F.2d 906, 907 (6th Cir. 1968).
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apparently felt that where a question of statutory interpretation was in-
volved, judicial review would be allowed whether or not the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies was deliberate.
The McKart Guidelines
In McKart the Supreme Court formulated a basic test to deter-
mine the applicability of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doc-
trine to cases where the "deprivation of judicial review occurs not when
the affected person is affirmatively asking for assistance from the courts
but when the Government is attempting to impose criminal sanctions on
him."24 The Court said that two questions must be asked:
[1] We must ask, then, whether there is in this case a governmental
interest compelling enough to outweigh the severe burden placed
on petitioner. . . . [2] [We must also ask whether allowing all
similarly situated registrants to bypass administrative appeal pro-
cedures would seriously impair the Selective Service System's
ability to perform its functions. 25
To assist courts in answering these questions in particular cases, the
Court suggested four policy considerations underlying the judicial ap-
plication of the exhaustion doctrine.26  The first three considerations
relate logically to the first basic question (Is there a compelling gov-
ernmental interest?) that the Court says must be asked. The three
considerations are (1) that "judicial review may be hindered by the
failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to
exercise its discretion or apply its expertise"; (2) that a complaining
party may successfully vindicate his rights without court intervention
if he is reqired to pursue his administrative remedies; (3) that "notions
of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to
discover and correct its own errors. '2 7 The fourth consideration, which
relates logically to the second basic question (Will the system's ability
to perform its functions be impaired?), is that "it is possible that fre-
quent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken
24. 395 U.S. at 197.
25. Id.
26. From the language of the Court's opinion, it appears that the reasons should
only be used as guidelines, that the existence or nonexistence of any one or more of them
would not necessarily be a controlling factor. Where none of the reasons appear, how-
ever, the application of the exhaustion doctrine would be difficult to support. See id. at
193-95.
27. "This reason is particularly pertinent where the function of an agency and the
particular decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of discretionary powers
granted the agency by Congress, or require application of special expertise." Id. at 194.
For discussion of the exhaustion doctrine as an expression of executive and administra-
tive autonomy, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-58
(1965).
[Vol. 22
SELECTIVE SERVICE
the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its pro-
cedures. '28
That these four policy factors are interrelated and that the distinc-
tions between them are not always clear is made manifest by their ap-
plication both in the majority opinion in McKart and in the dissent-
ing opinion in Lockhart. For example, both opinions discuss reasons
one and four separately while noting the other two sometimes explicitly
and sometimes implicitly along the way.29
Lockhart v. United States-A Question of
Administrative Discretion
The Factual Background
The Ninth Circuit decided Lockhart on facts somewhat different
from those in McKart. On his Classification Questionnaire Lockhart
stated that he was a student training for the ministry as a Jehovah's Wit-
ness. He then signed the portion of the form claiming conscientious
objector status and requesting the Special Form for Conscientious Ob-
jectors. The board sent him the Special Form, but Lockhart never re-
turned it. The board shortly thereafter classified him as available for
military service. In the notice of classification, the board informed
Lockhart of his right to a personal appearance and his right to appeal
his classification to the state appeal board. He failed to pursue either of
these remedies and some 5 months later wrote to his local board re-
questing what he termed "a Consciencances rejective form (religiouges
status) [sic]." 30 The local board complied with Lockhart's request and
again sent him the Special Form; this time he completed and returned
the form. His file was reopened and his classification reconsidered but
not changed. The board notified Lockhart of its action and again gave
him notice of his right to appeal.
Lockhart again failed to pursue his administrative remedies, and
shortly afterwards was ordered to report for induction. He reported but
refused to submit. Lockhart's principal defense to the resulting crimi-
nal prosecution was his assertion that the induction order was unlawful
because there was no basis in fact for the local board's denial of his re-
quest for a conscientious objector classification.31
Although Lockhart had completed 1 year of junior college, 2 his
28. 395 U.S. at 195.
29. Id. at 197-200; Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1154-56 (9th Cir.
1969) (dissenting opinion).
30. 420 F.2d at 1149 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 1144 (majority opinion).
32. Closing Brief for Appellant at 5, Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143
(9th Cir. 1969).
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communications with his local board indicate that he was only semi-
literate and that his religious views were unsophisticated.33 Lockhart's
classification notices also contained notice of his right to appeal,3 but
he testified at trial that he did not understand the meaning or signifi-
cance of the word "appeal."3
On appeal from the district court's refusal to consider Lockhart's
defense because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc and with two judges dissenting, affirmed.36
The court, citing a long line of cases, held that Lockhart was required
to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review
of his local-board classification because,
[b]y its nature, the question which Lockhart presented to the court
below is one which, for its resolution, necessarily requires the ap-
plication of discretion--discretion which, in the first instance, we
think Congress properly placed with the local and appeal boards
of our Selective Service System. 37
The Ninth Circuit emphasized its view that Lockhart's case was clearly
distinguishable from McKart.
Majority Opinion in Lockhart
Judge Ely, writing for the Ninth Circuit majority in Lockhart, dis-
tinguished McKart on the basis that the question there was one of statu-
tory interpretation-a legal question within the constitutional preroga-
tive of the judiciary and not a factual one committed to the exclusive
discretion or expertise of the Selective Service System.3" "Hence, . . .
there was no compelling need for an agency decision in the first in-
stance."39
The Ninth Circuit majority also relied upon DuVernay v. United
States,40 a Supreme Court decision in which the defendant in a prosecu-
33. 420 F.2d at 1149 (dissenting opinion). Articulateness is not a qualification
for conscientious objector status. United States v. James, 417 F.2d 826, 829 (4th Cir.
1969).
34. 420 F.2d at 1144.
35. 420 F.2d at 1150 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
36. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1969) (Browning &
Hamley, JJ., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 45-49 infra.
37. 420 F.2d at 1145-46.
38. Id. at 1146. "The resolution of that issue [of statutory interpretation] does
not require any particular expertise on the part of the appeal board; the proper interpre-
tations is certainly not a matter of discretion." McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
198 (1969). But two Justices questioned the Court's basing its decision on this point.
See note 20 supra.
39. 420 F.2d at 1146.
40. 394 U.S. 309 (1969), ajJ'g 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968). "Oral argument
in both DuVernay and McKart was heard by the Supreme Court on the same day, but
DuVernay's conviction was affirmed by an equally divided court, Mr. Justice Fortas not
participating." Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 22
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tion for draft refusal had alleged that his indictment was invalid on the
following grounds: that Negroes had been systematically excluded
from membership on his local board, that the local board's handling of
his case deprived him of due process and that the trial judge committed
reversible error when he refused to permit questions concerning the
Ku Klux Klan affiliations of the local board chairman. 41  The defen-
dant's attempt to raise these factual issues, decisions upon which were
not within the discretionary functions of the local board, was blocked by
the Supreme Court solely because he had failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies.42
The Ninth Circuit further determined that Lockhart's ignorance of
the fact that failure to appeal his classification would bar a later chal-
lenge to its validity could not be equated with the "rare and compelling'
reasons which, according to dicta in Donato v. United States,43 a prior
Ninth Circuit decision, might justify relaxation of the exhaustion re-
quirement. 44
The Dissenting Opinion in Lockhart
The two dissenting judges first determined that the induction order
was unlawful because the board's classification had no basis in fact.4"
From Lockhart's record testimony, the dissenters concluded that he had
no notice that his failure "to exercise the right to administrative review"
would later bar collateral attack upon the validity of his induction or-
41. DuVernay v. United States, 394 F.2d 979, 980 (5th Cir. 1968).
42. 394 U.S. 309 (1969), affg 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968).
43. 302 F.2d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1962). In Donato the defendant testified
that he had failed to appeal because he had been called to fire fighting duty and upon his
return, because the appeal period had expired, he believed his rights to appeal were lost.
Id. at 470. In fact the local board may permit a registrant to appeal "even though the
period for taking an appeal has elapsed, if it is satisfied that the failure of such person to
appeal within such period was due to a lack of understanding of the right to appeal or to
some cause beyond the control of such person." 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2(d) (1971).
44. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1969). The in-
terpretation of Donato by the Lockhart court is open to question even though it could be
said that it was interpreting its own prior decision. The Donato holding appears to turn
on the question of whether or not the failure to appeal was "a deliberate and intentional
rejection" of that right and not the physical inability of Donato to appeal during the
allowable period. See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1962).
See text accompanying note 100 infra.
45. 420 F.2d at 1149-50 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting judges found that
since Lockhart's claims, if true, met the statutory criteria for exemption, 50 U.S.C. APP.
§ 456(j) (Supp. V, 1970), the board could deny the requested classification only on the
basis of insincerity. There were no facts in the record to support a finding of insincerity
and no required statement of this disbelief in support of the board's decision. 420 F.2d
at 1147-48 & cases cited. This determination of unlawfulness of the board's order is
notable because it brings into sharp focus the validity of Lockhart's defense and, thus,
the very harshness of applying the exhaustion doctrine in this case.
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der."' They noted that the case presented a question of first impres-
sion and cited from McKart the basic test for determining whether or
not the exhaustion doctrine is to be applied in a particular case.47 Ap-
plying the doctrine can serve no useful purpose, the dissenters argued,
when the administrative process is at an end and when registrants are
not aware of the potential denial of judicial review when the decision to
appeal is still open to them.48 They further urged that the doctrine
should be operative in this situation only if the defendant has forfeited
his defense to a criminal prosecution by a deliberate bypassing of ad-
ministrative procedure.4 9 The dissenters concluded that Lockhart, who
did not understand his right to appeal or the consequences of relinquish-
ing it, did not waive the right and therefore should not have been barred
from his only defense. 50
Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Decision
It is important to emphasize the harshness of applying the exhaus-
tion doctrine to foreclose the registrant from raising a valid defense to a
criminal prosecution after the administrative process is at an end. This
is the basis of the Court's statement in McKart that there must be "a
governmental interest compelling enough to outweigh the severe bur-
den" which such application of the doctrine would place on the de-
fendant. 5 The Lockhart dissenters concluded that the four policy ob-
jectives behind the exhaustion doctrine
cannot be achieved as to defendant Lockhart and other registrants
who have completed the administrative process. For them the
administrative process is irrevocably closed .... 52
46. 420 F.2d at 1150, 1156 (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 1150-51, 1153. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. For an-
other Ninth Circuit discussion of the reasons for the exhaustion doctrine, see Croy-
croft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 1969).
48. 420 F.2d at 1153-54 (dissenting opinion).
49. Id. at 1155-56.
50. The Tenth Circuit has held that the appeal information printed on the classi-
fication notice is adequate notice of the right to administrative appeal. United States v.
Capson, 347 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965). The
First Circuit has similarly so held where it was also noted that no contention was made
that the defendant was incompetent, or could not understand the printed information.
United States v. Dunn, 383 F.2d 357, 358 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 982
(1968).
51. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
52. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion). The dissenters continued: "[The registrants'] administrative records can-
not be supplemented; their classifications cannot be changed; the Selective Service System
cannot correct its error, if any occured, in their classifications; and these registrants can-
not initiate administrative appeals, however strongly motivated they may be to do so."
[Vol. 22
Such summary disposition of the policy considerations is questionable.
To see this, it is necessary to examine the McKart considerations within
the Lockhart context in order to determine the extent of their applica-
tion.
Hindrance to Judicial Review
If Lockhart had taken an administrative appeal, a fuller develop-
ment of the factual record would have resulted. At the time of his local
board classification (1965), the Department of Justice would have been
required to conduct an inquiry and hearing.53 The dissenters in Lock-
hart recognize this;54 but as they also point out, these procedures have
since been abolished. Currently, the record on appeal is effectively con-
fined to the record before the local board.55
53. "Prior to [the 1967 amendments to the Selective Service Act] the Department
of Justice was required to conduct an inquiry and hearing whenever a registrant ap-
pealed a local board's denial of a conscientious objector claim, and the appeal board
tentatively determined that he was not entitled to a 1-0 or lower classification." Lock-
hart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion); accord,
United States v. Davila, 429 F.2d 481, 484 n.5 (5th Cir. 1970); compare Selective
Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, tit. I, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 with 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)
(Supp. V, 1970).
54. See note 53 supra.
55. The requirement of a Justice Department inquiry and hearing was deleted from
the Selective Service Act in 1967. Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81
Stat. 104 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) Supp. V, 1970). Now the appeal is con-
fined to (1) a written statement that the registrant is permitted to file with the appeal
board in which he "may set out in full any information which was offered to the local
board and which the local board failed or refused to include in the registrant's file," 32
C.F.R. § 1626.12 (1971); (2) the record before the local board; and (3) "Egleneral in-
formation concerning economic, industrial and social conditions," 32 C.F.R. § 1626.24
(b) (1971). Note that the registrant may neither appear before the appeal board nor be
represented by counsel before such board. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143,
1157 & n.18 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion); see 32 C.F.R. § 1626.24(b) (1971).
By Lockhart's failure to appeal, however, it is not true that the Selective Service System
was precluded from correcting its error or developing a record in support of its decision.
The local board on its own initiative has the power to call the registrant and others to
appear before it and to produce evidence, 32 C.F.R. § 1621.15 (1971), to obtain infor-
mation from local, state and national governmental agencies, id. § 1621.14 (1971), and
to call on the investigative agencies of the Federal Government. Dickinson v. United
States, 346 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1954); accord, Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143,
1156 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion). Besides these powers to develop a fuller
factual record, the agency has the power, on its own initiative, to correct its own er-
rors. First, regulations require the local board to reopen a registrant's classification
upon the written request of the State or National Director. McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 189 n.4, 199 n.17 (1969); 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(a) (1971). Second, the
Government appeal agent is expressly authorized to "appeal to an appeal board from the
classification of a registrant by the local board." Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d
1143, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion), quoting 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2(b)
(1971). Although the agent is required to be "equally diligent in protecting the in-
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An appeal by Lockhart would have also allowed the System to re-
exercise its discretion or reapply its expertise. The Lockhart majority
points out that the factual question56 of the sincerity of Lockhart's be-
liefs "is simply not amenable to unerring objective determination,"' 57 and
therefore "necessarily requires the application of discretion."58  And
as the Supreme Court emphasized in McKart, "[t]he Selective Service
System is empowered by Congress to make such discretionary deter-
minations and only the local and appeal boards have the necessary ex-
pertise." 59 This follows from a section of the Selective Service Act pro-
viding (1) that the System has the power to "hear and determine, all
questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or de-
ferment from, training and service under this title" and (2) that judi-
terests of the Government and the rights of the registrant in all matters," 32 C.F.R. §
1604.71 (d)(5) (1971), the probability of action by an appeal agent is quite low; in the
past, appeal agents have been almost totally inactive. Lockhart v. United States,
420 F.2d 1143, 1153 n.9, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion), citing NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES IF
NOTALL SERVE? 28-29 (1967).
56. Recently, another circuit has come to the opposite result from that reached
by the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Davila, 429 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1970), a case
decided after Lockhart on very similar facts, the Fifth Circuit took a different approach
to the legal versus fact issue in its application of the McKart guidelines and reversed
Davila's conviction. The court noted that the defendant had no excuse for failing to
exhaust administrative remedies, but it did not consider this important. Id. at 483 n.1.
It distinguished Lockhart only on the basis of the existence of the 1967 amendments to
the Selective Service Act at the time of Davila's failure to appeal. Id. at 484 n.5. See
note 53 infra. The court felt that once it is established that there are no facts in the reg-
istrant's file refuting his claim of conscientious objection, "the only question remaining
is the legal issue of whether or not the registrant has made out a prima facie case for ex-
emption . . . . The appeal board can bring no special expertise to bear on this ques-
tion, and the Selective Service System's discretion is explicitly limited by the legal stand-
ard that a given minimal showing requires exemption." Id. at 484; accord, United
States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261, 271 (E.D. Ark. 1968). By this route the Fifth Cir-
cuit avoids the complicated issue of deliberateness and thus minimizes its significance
when the question concerns the existence of a prima facie case for exemption. The con-
flict between Lockhart and Davila points to a need for clarification by the Supreme
Court. Such a clarification may soon occur since the Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari in a Selective Service case similar to Davila, McGee v. United States,
426 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 101 (1970), where one of the ques-
tions to be answered is whether the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
should be applied where denial of the registrant's claimed conscientious objector status
by the local board had no basis in fact. There is a summary of the petition in McGee
in 39 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1970).
57. Id.; see, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955); Bishop v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Bradley v. United
States, 218 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1954).
58. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1969). See text
accompanying note 37 supra.
59. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 198 n.16 (1969).
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cial review "shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved
to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is
no basis in fact for the classification" of registrants."0
Vindication of Rights at the Administrative Level
Certainly Lockhart might have been successful on appeal: The
appeal board might have reclassified Lockhart as a conscientious objec-
tor and thereby vindicated his claim. Although evidence that an ad-
ministrative appeal would have appeared futile to the defendant may
preclude application of the exhaustion doctrine,6 ' in Lockhart there was
no showing that the defendant could have reasonably assumed or be-
lieved (1) that no appeal to the appeal board was required, or (2) that
an appeal was fruitless.
Preservation of Administrative Autonomy
The third consideration is relevant only if it is determined that the
question for review is within the System's discretion or expertise. If the
latter situation exists, then it is in the interest of efficient System opera-
tion and judicial administration to allow the System to correct its own
errors.62  As stated by the majority in Lockhart, avoidable interference
by the courts "would quickly lead the courts to exercise their judicial
discretion in areas wherein they should be powerless to act."6 3
Lockhart's conscientious objector claim would appear to be an
example of a question requiring the application of discretion or exper-
tise 4 -discretion reposed by Congress in the Selective Service System. 5
An appeal by Lockhart would have given the system the chance to dis-
cover and correct its own error; application of the exhaustion require-
ment in Lockhart would thereby further administrative autonomy.
Consideration of the first three of the McKart policy guidelines 6
60. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 3 supra.
61. See Glover v. United States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961). The court did not
apply the exhaustion rule where the local board failed to inform the defendant of the
reason for issuing an unappealed classification order, which was identical to one previ-
ously appealed. The court stated: "Under the facts of this case we believe defendant
was amply justified, as a reasonable person, in feeling that nothing further could be ac-
complished by appellate procedure." Id. at 90.
62. See note 27 supra.
63. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1969).
64. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 198 n.16 (1969).
65. See text accompanying note 59 supra. The majority in Lockhart was more
definite in its conclusion: "Here, where evaluation of Lockhart's claim would involve the
court in matters clearly committed to the discretion of local and appeal boards within
the Selective Service System, application of the doctrine serves the important objectives
supporting the rule." 420 F.2d at 1147 (footnotes omitted).
66. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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clearly supports the result of the Lockhart majority. It must be noted,
however, that all three of these guidelines refer only to the first step of
the two-step test-the sufficiency of a governmental interest in applying
the exhaustion doctrine.
The last guideline to be considered relates to the other portion of
the test-the extent to which the Selective Service's ability to perform
its function would be impaired by allowing judicial review. Even if a
compelling governmental interest does exist, the right of a criminal de-
fendant to assert a defense should be recognized, especially in the ab-
sence of serious impairment of the operation of the Selective Service
System.
Impairment of the Agency's Function
The primary function of the Selective Service System is the rapid
mobilization of manpower. 7 Will relaxation of the exhaustion require-
ment in cases involving administrative discretion or expertise adversely
affect that function? The majority in Lockhart did not deal with this
question, but the dissenting judges discussed it 68--as did the Supreme
Court in McKart,6 9 which provided the answer:
In short, we simply do not think that the exhaustion doctrine
contributes significantly to the fairly low number of registrants who
decide to subject themselves to criminal prosecution for failure to
submit to induction."
The Supreme Court gave three reasons for its conclusion. First,
the threat of criminal sanctions will insure that the "great majority" of
registrants will exhaust all available administrative remedies.7 1  The
Lockhart dissenters also pointed out that possible denial of judicial re-
view will effectively deter bypassing of the administrative appeal process
only "if registrants were aware of the potential penalty at the time they
were called upon to decide whether or not to appeal."72  Most likely,
few are aware, the dissenters argued, since neither the act, the regula-
tions nor the notices given to registrants by the agency suggest that fail-
ure to appeal will bar subsequent judicial review.73  Second, the Mc-
Kart rule applies only to those registrants whose classifications do not
require exercise of administrative discretion and expertise. 74  Third,
67. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 199 (1969).
68. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
69. 395 U.S. at 199-200.
70. Id. at 200.
71. Id.
72. 420 F.2d at 1154 (dissenting opinion).
73. Id.
74. 395 U.S. at 200.
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the Supreme Court was not convinced that many registrants would
bypass the System's procedures "with the thought that their ulti-
mate chances of success in the courts are enhanced thereby."7 5  Some
reasons for this conclusion were suggested by the dissenting judges in
Lockhart:78 (1) While an administrative appeal is pending, the regis-
trant cannot be inducted;7 7 (2) he may submit evidence to the appeal
board to rectify omissions in the administrative record;" (3) the board
is required to make a de novo determination of the classification; 79 (4)
the majority of refusals to grant conscientious objector status that are
appealed are granted; 0 (5) in a criminal prosecution, judicial review
is effectively confined to the administrative record;"' and (6) the scope
of the review is very limited.12  Thus, it cannot be reasonably con-
cluded that allowing judicial review in the absence of exhausting ad-
ministrative appeals will seriously impair the Selective Service's per-
formance of its function.88
Even if the System's operation were impaired, the right of a de-
fendant to assert a defense in a criminal prosecution must be taken into
account. This requires a consideration of the deliberateness of his fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Waiver Test and the Need to Apply It
Requiring a finding of deliberateness in failing to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies and an understanding of the consequences before ap-
plication of the exhaustion rule will insure the protection of the right to
assert a defense to a criminal prosecution. This protection should be
required to safeguard the accused's fundamental right to due process.
This can best be done by testing the failure to exhaust by a determina-
tion of whether or not a waiver has occurred. 4 The classic definition
75. Id.
76. 420 F.2d at 1154 (dissenting opinion).
77. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.41, 1627.8 (1971).
78. Id. § 1626.12.
79. Id. § 1626.26(a).
80. 420 F.2d at 1154 n.l (dissenting opinion).
81. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 453-55 (1947).
82. See 50 U.S.C. APP. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970), which is reproduced in part
at note 3 supra.
83. United States v. Davila, 429 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1970), was a case decided
upon essentially the same facts as were found in Lockhart, except that no excuse for
failure to appeal was offered by the defendant The court there reversed the appellant's
conviction while agreeing with McKart that exercising judicial review would "not sig-
nificantly encourage circumventing the administrative process ... [since] the oppor-
tunity to appeal is one that few registrants will knowingly forego, because of the risk
incident to determining the issue of classification in court under the strict basis in fact
test with the possibility of criminal conviction." Id. at 485. See note 56 supra.
84. For the purpose of analogy, it is interesting to note that the administrative
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of waiver was given in Johnson v. Zerbst,8 5 which involved a defendant's
right to counsel. "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.""6  Before a valid
waiver can take place, knowledge of the consequences of foregoing the
waived privilege is essential, for "[i]t is only through awareness of these
consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and
intelligent exercise of the privilege. '8 7  The waiver rule should not be
applied, however, (1) if it appears from the circumstances that exer-
cise of the privilege would have been futile, 8  (2) if failure to exercise
the privilege was excusable or (3) if the forfeiture imposed by applica-
tion of the rule would be great.89
Waiver is closely related to the doctrine of exhaustion." The rea-
sons for refusing to apply the concepts in particular cases are similar.91
Discretionary denial of a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas
corpus is limited to instances where there has been a deliberate and un-
derstanding waiver of a state court remedy.92 The reasons93 for this
rules established for the guidance of local boards include a waiver rule. This rule may
be relaxed by the local board for allowing an appeal to an appeal board or to the Presi-
dent if the board is satisfied that the registrant's failure to appeal within the required
time was due either to a "lack of understanding of the right to appeal" or to some cause
"beyond the control of such person." 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.2(d), 1627.3 (1971). The
waiver rule is set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 1641.2(b) (1971) which provides: "If a regis-
trant or any other person concerned fails to claim and exercise any right or privilege
within the required time, he shall be deemed to have waived the right or privilege."
85. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
86. Id. at 464. The Court stated further that "[tihe determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id.
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
88. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a Selective Service case
where one of the questions to be answered is whether futility precludes application of
the exhaustion doctrine. McGee v. United States, 426 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 91 S. Ct. 101 (1970). A summary of the petition in McGee appears in 39
U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1970).
89. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE ACTION 455 (1965).
90. Id. at 454.
91. Compare id. at 455 with Glover v. United States, 286 F.2d 84, 90 (8th Cir.
1961) (futility in exhaustion) and Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468, 470 (9th
Cir. 1962) (excusable failure) and McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969)
(burden imposed by forfeiture) (dictum).
92. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion), citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). "[T]he federal judge has
the discretion to deny relief to one who has deliberately sought to subvert or evade the
orderly adjudication of his federal defenses in the state courts. Surely no stricter rule is
a realistic necessity. A man under conviction for crime has an obvious inducement to
do his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake his all on the outcome of a
federal habeas proceeding which, in many respects, may be less advantageous to him
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"apply equally to limit forfeiture of a registrant's defense to a criminal
accusation to instances in which there has been a deliberate and under-
standing waiver of an administrative remedy."94  In both situations the
purpose of the exhaustion requirement is the same-to punish the liti-
gant for his default and to deter others who might do the same in the
future, thereby preserving an orderly procedure. In both the forfeited
right is a fundamental one."5
The Departure in Lockhart
In affirming the district court's decision against the defendant,
the Ninth Circuit in Lockhart expressly held that both courts were ap-
plying a "well-established" rule in Selective Service cases . 6  However,
virtually all the cases cited by the court are distinguishable from Lock-
hart on a factual basis. In some it was found that the registrant under-
stood the nature of his right to an administrative appeal, thus implying
that his failure was deliberate and knowing.97  In the others the district
courts had rejected as factually untrue allegations of ignorance of the
right or of inability to exercise it.08  The court's failure to distinguish
these former decisions is all the more striking because the distinction
was clearly recognized in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Donato v.
United States:99
This court's strict adherence to the rule that administrative remedies
must be exhausted has been (as in Prohoroff v. United States, 9
Cir., 1958, 259 F.2d 694, and Evans v. United States, 9 Cir., 1958,
252 F.2d 509) in cases where failure to appeal appeared to be a
deliberate and intentional rejection of the administrative review
than a state court proceeding. [Citation omitted.] And if because of inadvertence or
neglect he runs afoul of a state procedural requirement, and thereby forfeits his state
remedies, . . . those consequences should be sufficient to vindicate the State's valid in-
terest in orderly procedure. Whatever residuum of state interest there may be under
such circumstances is manifestly insufficient in the face of the federal policy . . . of
affording an effective remedy for restraints contrary to the Constitution." 372 U.S. at
433-34.
93. See note 92 supra.
94. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissent-
ing opinion).
95. Id. at 1155; see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
96. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1145-47 (9th Cir. 1969).
97. Edwards v. United States, 395 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845
(1968); Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
914 (1964); Prohoroff v. United States, 259 F.2d 694, (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 907 (1959); Evans v. United States, 252 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1958).
98. Woo v. United States, 350 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1965); Greiff v. United States,
348 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1965).
99. 302 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1962).
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which had been provided. An area does remain, however, within
which relaxation of the rule can be found to be just and proper. 100
The majority in Lockhart failed to distinguish, on this same basis,
a recent case decided by the Supreme Court and heavily relied upon by
the majority-DuVernay v. United States.101 An equally divided court
affirmed a court of appeals decision that had held that collateral attack
on the registrant's classification was foreclosed by failure of the regis-
trant to pursue his administrative remedies. However, the lower court
had emphasized that there was no evidence that DuVernay was un-
familiar with the administrative procedure or was "incapable of under-
standing" it. The court indicated that DuVernay's previous actions
showed he understood the importance of taking immediate steps to
correct a classification he believed erroneous."0 '
A district court within the Ninth Circuit decided a case prior to
Lockhart, but not cited therein, that lends much support to the conten-
tion that the exhaustion requirement should be relaxed where the de-
fendant fails to administratively appeal his local-board classification
because of illiteracy. In United States v. Harris' the district court,
citing the earlier Ninth Circuit three-judge panel decision in Lock-
hart,104 held that exceptional circumstances precluded the application
of the exhaustion rule:
This rule is not inflexible, and it should be relaxed in exceptional
circumstances. . . .I find that this is such a case. Defendant has
a limited education. He did not finish the eighth grade until age
16. He reads with difficulty. He has not been employed regularly
since he left school, and when he has worked it has been at menial
jobs. Defendant has very little money, and he did not have the
100. Id. at 470. See also Daniels v. United States, 372 F.2d 407, 414 (9th Cir.
1967), where the court left open the question of lack of due process as a result of lack of
notice that failure to report to the local board for a civilian work assignment would bar
later collateral attack on the validity of the registrant's classification.
101. 394 U.S. 309 (1969), affg 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968). This decision is
difficult to reconcile with McKart since DuVernay's defense was also clearly nondis-
cretionary in nature. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
102. DuVernay v. United States, 394 U.S. 309 (1969). One court has distin-
guished DuVernay "as a case where petitioner failed in the criminal prosecution to raise
as a defense the local board's refusal to reopen his classification based upon claims of
student deferment, then a hardship deferment and finally an occupational deferment,
... thereby cutting off the possibility that a favorable disposition of any one of the
classification claims would have left no remnant of his other constitutional claims."
United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225, 235 n.58 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Mc-
Neil v. United States, 395 U.S. 463 (1969), where the Court remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of McKart. The court of appeals had applied the exhaustion doctrine and
thus barred the defendant from attacking his local board's denial of his conscientious
objector claim. The defendant had not given any reason for his failure to appeal. Mc-
Neil v. United States, 401 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1968).
103. 302 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Ore. Dec. 3, 1968).
104. Lockhart v. United States, No. 21311 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1968).
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assistance of a lawyer until the Government filed this action. He
cannot reasonably be charged with knowledge of his right to appeal,
and therefore it would be unconscionable to decline review of his
classification because he did not exhaust his administrative reme-
dies. 0 5
Conclusion
Use of the exhaustion doctrine in the Lockhart situation would be
exceedingly harsh.
The defendant is. . .stripped of his only defense; he must go tojail without having any judicial review of an assertedly invalid order.
This deprivation of judicial review occurs not when the affected
person is affirmatively asking for assistance from the courts but
when the Government is attempting to impose criminal sanctions
on him.1°6
The severe burden placed on the unknowing registrant demands a com-
pelling governmental interest to outweigh it. Such a compelling in-
terest has not been convincingly demonstrated in Lockhart.
Even if the McKart policy considerations do not compel the re-
laxation of the exhaustion doctrine in Lockhart, application of the
waiver rule would demand such a result.
Applying the waiver test in Selective Service prosecutions will in-
sure equal protection for the poor, the ignorant and the illiterate.10 7
Such discrimination against the unsophisticated was recognized in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,10 8 which involved the right to counsel:
Finally, we must realize the imposition of the requirement for the
request [for counsel] would discriminate against the defendant who
does not know his rights. . . .To require the request would be to
favor the defendant whose sophistication or status has fortuitously
prompted him to make it.109
Without the waiver rule in the Lockhart-type situation, the law discrimi-
nates against the person who does not know his rights or who cannot
afford counsel to guide him through the procedural complexities of per-
fecting a conscientious objector claim." 0  The Selective Service Act
provides that the system of classification and selection should be "just
105. 302 F. Supp. at 1196.
106. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969).
107. The Supreme Court has often proclaimed that before the law a citizen must
not be poor or ignorant at his peril. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-72
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963); Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
108. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
109. Id. at 471, quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 369-
70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78 (1965).
110. This point was argued unsuccessfully in Opening Brief for Appellant at 13,
Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1969).
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and fair";11' the Supreme Court long ago declared that the "customary
safeguards" for the protection of an accused must apply to cases under
the act." 2 In view of the intricate bureaucratic procedures that con-
front a registrant" 3 and the illusory nature of the assistance the System
provides," 4 the importance of safeguarding the rights of the accused
cannot be overemphasized. Only a concrete standard such as the
waiver test, which limits the application of the exhaustion rule, can in-
sure the maintenance of a registrant's constitutional rights.
The Selective Service System makes few efforts to assist registrants
who are left alone, untutored and ignorant, to confront its labyrinthine
bureaucracy. The rights of the poor, the uneducated and the illiterate
are most vulnerable. The courts exist to protect the individual's consti-
tutional rights and to act as a check against both the overzealousness and
indifference of executive agencies. The Ninth Circuit's failure to apply
the waiver test in Lockhart may well have resulted in a deprivation of
due process and has set an unhappy precedent."'
J. Kendrick Kresse*
111. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
112. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946).
113. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1152, & n.5 (9th Cir. 1969) (dis-
senting opinion).
114. The regulations state that advisors "may" be appointed "to advise and assist
registrants," 32 C.F.R. § 1604.41 (1971), but none had been so appointed in California
at the time of Lockhart's prosecution; nor have the System's appeal agents been diligent
in their duties. Lockhart v. United States, 420 F.2d 1143, 1152-53 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1969)
(dissenting opinion). See note 55 supra.
115. See United States v. Powell, 421 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1970). Citing Lockhart
the court held that by failing to avail himself of the right to appeal his classification,
after being advised of such right, the registrant failed to exhaust administrative remedies
and could not challenge his classification in a criminal prosecution for refusing to sub-
mit to induction. Id. At trial, Powell did testify that he received his classification
form (which contains a notice of right to appeal), but that he did not remember whether
or not he read the form. Brief for Appellee at 5.
Powell indicates the willingness of the Ninth Circuit to rely indiscriminately on
Lockhart as precedent. The facts in Powell show a lack of diligence in the petitioner,
not found in Lockhart, that justify the Powell decision in light of other Ninth Circuit
cases. See, e.g., Greiff v. United States, 348 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1965).
* Member, Second Year Class
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